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ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS 
UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT 
OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
(ICSID CONVENTION) 
VINCENT O. ORLU NMEHIELLE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the world of international economic relations, disputes are bound to 
arise which require settlement mechanisms to ensure their effective 
resolution. Such dispute settlement mechanisms will ordinarily entail the 
assumption of obligations by both parties, or by one party to protect the 
interest of the other. This assumption of obligations should translate into 
positive actions of compliance with the measures inherent in the dispute 
resolution mechanism. It has been observed that one should be wary of 
the man who urges an action in which he himself incurs no risk. 1 
Arbitration is one mode of dispute resolution that has become immensely 
popular in international economic dispute resolution among players in 
the international economic arena, because it is different from domestic 
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judicial adjudication, and due to the sensitive jurisdictional implications 
arising from the supremacy of competing legal systems. One such area in 
which arbitration has assumed great importance is in the settlement of 
investment disputes, especially between private investors and host states. 
The importance that the international community attaches to this sector 
of international economic relations has led to the promulgation of the 
International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
("ICSID Convention" or "the Convention,,)2 under the aegis of the World 
Bank, to cover the settlement of investment disputes between investors 
and host states. The ICSID Convention, in turn, established the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dispute ("the 
Center") which implements the provisions of the ICSID Convention. 
One area of the dispute resolution mechanism under the ICSID 
Convention that attracts academic comment is the enforcement of ICSID 
arbitral awards under article 54 of the Convention. The question is often 
raised whether the provisions of the Convention promote effective 
enforcement of ICSID arbitral awards. This is due to the place accorded 
domestic law in resolving questions of sovereign immunity in the 
enforcement of arbitral awards and other issues that seem to impinge on 
the effective enforcement of ICSID awards. 
This article addresses the broad question of enforcement of ICSID 
arbitral awards under the Convention, with the goal of analyzing the 
attendant issues. The article is divided into four parts. Part Two deals 
with background issues such as the purpose of ICSID as envisaged by the 
ICSID Convention and the composition of the ICSID. Part Three 
analyzes the ICSID arbitral process and discusses the ICSID's 
jurisdiction and the constitution of its arbitral panel. Part Four, the main 
section, discusses the recognition and enforcement of awards. This 
section will analyze the various steps of enforcement: recognition, 
enforcement itself, and execution of awards that have been adjudged 
enforceable. The article will examine the jurisprudence that has been 
developed in some ICSID cases before domestic courts of member states 
to the ICSID Convention. Part Four also discusses the practical effects 
of these cases and analyzes the impact of the annulment provision and 
process under the Convention on the ICSID mechanism. 
2. March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090,575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE PURPOSE OF ICSID 
As the international financial institution that provides loans for 
production and development purposes to its member countries, the World 
Bank upholds international investment. The World Bank's founders 
believed that the principal function of the institution would be to 
encourage international investment by private investors.3 The World 
Bank thus champions the ICSID Convention's goals of advancing 
international cooperation for economic development in developing 
countries through private investment and promotion of mutual 
confidence between governments of developing countries and foreign 
investors.4 
According to Ibrahim Shihata, immediate past Vice President and 
General Counsel of the World Bank and Secretary-General of the ICSID, 
the primary objective of the ICSID is to promote a climate of mutual 
confidence between investors and states so as to increase the flow of 
resources to developing countries under reasonable conditions.5 It is 
therefore expected that like the World Bank, the ICSID must be regarded 
as an instrument of international policy for promoting investment and 
economic development.6 
The key purpose in establishing ICSID was to assure foreign investors of 
protection under international law from unilateral actions of host 
countries which could jeopardize their investments. At the same time, 
host countries of foreign investments are assured a neutral dispute 
resolution mechanism that shields them from the economic 
manipulations of developed countries.7 The ICSID thus provides a level 
playing field for host countries and foreign investors alike. This balance 
is created by both the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of 
3. See Ibrahim F. Shihata, The Settlement of Dispute Regarding Foreign Investment: The 
Role of the World Bank, With Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 AM. V.I. INT'L. & POL'y 
97 (1986). 
4. See Christopher M. Koa, The International Bankfor Reconstruction and Development and 
Dispute Resolution: Conciliation and Arbitration with China through the International Center for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 24 N.Y.V. I. INT'L L. & POL. 439,445 (1991). 
5. See Ibrahim Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The 
Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REv. - F.IL.I. 1,4(1986). 
6. Id. 
7. Ordinarily, developing countries may not readily submit to arbitration with non-state 
entities in international fora commonly used by private parties because of the perceived unequal 
status of states and non-states and because of the potential compromises in sovereign dignity 
involved in acceding to arbitration. 
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Arbitration. While the Convention gives private investors access to an 
international forum, the Rules assure them that the absence of a state 
party to the dispute or its refusal to participate in proceedings after it has 
consented to ICSID arbitration cannot frustrate the arbitral process.8 
On the other hand, the ICSID Convention provides that a contracting 
state may, as a condition of its consent to ICSID arbitration, require prior 
exhaustion of domestic remedies.9 This condition may be stipulated in 
the investment agreement, in a bilateral treaty between the host country 
and the investor's country, or in a declaration made by a contracting state 
at the time of signature or ratification of the ICSID Convention.1O 
Further, Article 42( 1) of the ICSID Convention expressly provides that 
unless the parties have specifically agreed otherwise, the arbitral tribunal 
must decide a dispute in accordance with the law of the host state, along 
with such rules of international law as may be applicable. 
The report of the executive directors of the World Bankll recognizes that 
when a host state consents to the submission of a dispute with an investor 
to ICSID, thereby giving the investor direct access to international 
jurisdiction, the investor should not be in a position to ask its state to 
espouse its cause. 12 This provision eliminates the use of diplomatic 
protection by the investor's state, or the institution of an international 
claim, unless the host state fails to comply with the award rendered in the 
dispute. This position also strengthens an implied objective of the ICSID 
Convention: the depoliticization of investment disputes to enhance the 
larger goal of promoting an atmosphere of mutual confidence between 
states and foreign investors, favorable to increasing the flow of resources 
to developing countries. 
While the main purpose of the ICSID Convention is to level the playing 
field for private investors in international investment dispute settlements, 
the enforcement of awards arising under the Convention does not follow 
the same rules. As will be discussed in more detail in Part Four of this 
article, the ICSID Convention allows the politics of national sovereignty 
to affect enforcement. That, in the opinion of this author, stands out as 
politicization of the supposedly level playing field. 
8. Art. 45 of the ICSID Convention. See also Rule 42 of ICSID Rules. 
9. Art. 26. 
10. See Shihata, supra note 3, at 102. 
II. REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES, 4 I.L.M. 524 (1965). 
12. See art. 27 of the ICSID Convention. 
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B. COMPOSITION OF THE ICSID 
The ICSID is composed of an Administrative Council, a Secretariat, a 
Panel of Arbitrators, and a Panel of Conciliators. 13 Each member of the 
Administrative Council represents a contracting member state to the 
Convention and a Chairman. 14 The Administrative Council is therefore 
the governing body of the ICSID and has a wide range of powers and 
functions l5 bestowed upon it by the ICSID Convention. As government 
representatives, members of the Administrative Council receive no 
remuneration from ICSID. 16 
The Secretariat consists of the Secretary-General, one or more Deputy 
Secretaries-General, and other staff. 17 The Secretary-General and the 
Deputy Secretary-General are elected by the Administrative Council on 
the nomination of the Chairman after due consultation with the Council. 
The Secretariat is the principal administrative organ of the ICSID, with 
the Secretary-General performing the functions of Registrar and having 
the power to authenticate arbitral awards rendered pursuant to the 
provisions of the Convention. 
The offices of Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General are 
purely non- political. The panels are composed of arbitrators or 
conciliators nominated by either a contracting state or the Chairman of 
the Administrative Council. 18 Members of the panels must be persons of 
high moral character with recognized competence in the fields of law, 
commerce, industry, or finance, the general requirements of persons 
occupying positions in international adjudicating or quasi-adjudicating 
bodies. 
The composition of the ICSID reflects the importance of contracting 
states and therefore places them at the top of decision-making under the 
ICSID Convention. As members of the Administrative Council, states 
adopt rules of procedure for the institution of conciliation and arbitration 
proceedings, as well as for conciliation and arbitration processes. The 
13. Art. 3 of the ICSID Convention. 
14. The President of the World Bank is the ex officio chairman of the council. See art. 5 of the 
ICSID Convention. 
IS. See art. 6 of the ICSID Convention on the powers and functions of the Administrative 
Council. 
16. See art. 8 of the ICSID Convention. 
17. See generally arts. 9 to II of the ICSID Convention on composition and functions of the 
Secretariat. 
18. By virtue of art. 13(1) and (2) of the ICSID Convention, a contracting state may designate 
to each panel four persons who need not be its nationals, while the Chairman may designate up to 
ten persons to each panel. 
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involvement of contracting states in fashioning these rules is an 
indication of the seriousness of the ICSID scheme as a self-contained 
dispute settlement mechanism which should promote effective 
enforcement of awards arising under the ICSID arbitration process. 
III. THE ICSID'S ARBITRATION PROCESS 
A. JURISDICTION 
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention provides for the jurisdiction of 
the ICSID. According to that article: 
The jurisdiction of the Center shall extend to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment between a Contracting State 
(or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State, 
which the parties to the dispute in writing consent to submit to 
the Center. When the parties have given their consent, no party 
may withdraw its consent unilaterally. 
Thus, for the ICSID to be vested with jurisdiction, a case must flrst 
involve a legal dispute arising out of an investment. Second, the dispute 
must be between a contracting state or its authorized constituent 
subdivision or agency, and a national of another contracting state. Third, 
the parties must have consented in writing to bring their dispute to the 
ICSID, and such consent may not be unilaterally withdrawn. 
Some concepts in Article 25(1) require further clariflcation. For 
example, the term "investment" was not deflned by the ICSID 
Convention. This was not an oversight, but a deliberate attempt by the 
drafters of the Convention to have a wider and more flexible 
interpretation covering major international business transactions rather 
than just trade in the traditional sense. Thus, the term tends to include 
joint ventures, among other traditional investment projects. It might also 
encompass capital contributions, loans, "associations between States and 
foreign investors, such as proflt sharing, service and management 
contracts, tum-key contracts, international leasing arrangements and 
agreements for the transfer of know-how and technology.,,19 
Article 25(2) deflnes a "national" of another contracting state as follows: 
19. GEORGE DELAUME, LAW AND PRAcrtCE OF TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACfS, 351, 353 
(1988) cited in Koa, supra note 4, at 452. 
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(a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting 
State other than the State party to the dispute on the date on 
which the parties consented to submit such dispute to 
conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date on which the 
request was registered pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 28 or 
paragraph (3) of Article 36, but does not include any person who 
on either date also had the nationality of the Contracting State 
Party to the dispute; and 
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a 
Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute on the 
date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to 
conciliation or arbitration and any juridical person which had the 
nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that 
date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have 
agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting 
State for the purposes of this Convention. 
27 
Realizing the practical situation in many developing countries, Article 
25(2) provides a mechanism for investors to gain access to the ICSID. 
This is so even when a local company, as subsidiary of a foreign investor 
through whom the foreign investor must channel all investments based 
on domestic law and regulations, is the appropriate party to the dispute. 
The fact that a local company may be under foreign control, despite its 
incorporation under the domestic law of the contracting state, may make 
it a national of a contacting state for purposes of the ICSID Convention. 
Whether an investor should be treated as a national of a contracting state 
based on foreign control must be decided based on circumstances, 
despite the provision that treating an investor as such requires agreement 
of the parties to the particular contract. This agreement need not be in 
writing. The conduct of the parties may suffice to prove such 
agreement.20 
A further requirement is that consent to the jurisdiction of the ICSID 
excludes all other remedies21 and may not be unilaterally withdrawn.22 
This requirement emphasizes and consolidates the mutuality of the 
binding consent which is the cornerstone of ICSID jurisdiction, 
20. See generally. Liberia E. Timber Corp. (letco) v. Government of Liberia, ICSID 
ARBITRATION n.31 (1986),26 I.L.M. 647 (1987), 13 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION YEARBOOK 35, 
37-41 (1988). 
21. See art. 26 of the ICSID Convention. 
22. Agip v. Popular Republic of Congo, ICSID CASE No. ARB177/1, 211.L.M 726 (1982). 
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especially where a contracting state does not subject its consent to the 
exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies. It does not 
matter if such a party seeks provisional measures; it must seek such 
measures through the ICSID tribunal.23 
It should be reiterated that in the various jurisdictional bases of the 
ICSID under the Convention, the drafters of the Convention displayed 
the need to balance the playing field between developing countries and 
foreign investors. Developing countries have ample opportunities within 
the jurisdiction provisions to enter into investment contracts with all 
legal precautions. On the other hand, investors are assured that entering 
into such contracts will guarantee them access to the ICSID without fear 
that the contracting host state may not have been serious. This could be 
contrary to the spirit of the ICSID Convention. The enforcement 
provisions, however, do not seem to implement this spirit of the 
Convention in a practical way. 
B. INITIATING ARBITRATION 
The procedure for initiating an ICSID arbitration begins with a request 
by either the contracting state or the foreign national party to the 
dispute?4 The Secretary-General then registers the request, unless there 
is reason to believe that the dispute in question is manifestly outside the 
jurisdiction of the Center, in which case he will refuse to register the 
dispute.25 If the request is registered, the Arbitration Panel or Tribunal 
is constituted in accordance with the agreement of the parties. Where 
there is no such agreement, the Tribunal is comprised of three arbitrators, 
one appointed by each party and the third, the President of the Tribunal, 
is appointed by the mutual agreement of the parties. 26 If the parties 
cannot agree on the appointment of any of the arbitrators, the Chairman 
of the Administrative Council may appoint the remaining arbitrators after 
consultation with the parties.27 
The arbitration proceedings are conducted in accordance with the 
Convention and the Arbitration Rules unless the parties to the dispute opt 
out of the rules. The rules cover such issues as cross-examination of 
witnesses, evidence, and the language in which the proceeding is to be 
23. See Guinea and Soguipeche v. Atlantic Triton Co., 241.L.M. 340 (Rennes Ct. App. 1984). 
24. Art. 36 of the ICSID Convention. 
25. Art. 36 (3) of the ICSID Convention. 
26. Art. 37 of the ICSID Convention. 
27. Art. 38 of the ICSID Convention. 
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conducted?S The parties can also select the substantive law the Tribunal 
will apply.29 The Convention allows the law of the host state party to 
apply if the parties do not provide for any substantive law, with the 
requirement that the host state's law comply with applicable rules of 
international law. 30 
Since Article 26 of the Convention excludes reliance on any other 
remedy once the parties consent to ICSID arbitration, a party to a dispute 
subject to the ICSID's jurisdiction must rule out the possibility of using 
any other forum. Unless the Tribunal declines jurisdiction, the 
proceedings must continue in accordance with the Convention and the 
Center's Rule of Arbitration where applicable until the Tribunal arrives 
at an award. Once rendered, an award becomes binding on the parties, 
and may be recognized in the courts of any contracting state as if it were 
a "final judgment of a court in that State.,,3! 
The ICSID arbitration process gives the parties complete autonomy in 
choosing how the dispute between them should be settled. It is only 
when the parties fail to exercise this autonomy that the machinery of the 
Center is enlisted. Awards are thus enforced without major obstacles, 
except where there is manifest fraud or gross illegality. 
N. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS 
The effectiveness of international arbitration ultimately depends on 
whether the arbitral award can be enforced against the losing party.32 
Enforcement does not necessarily mean that there must be court action 
before the arbitral award is complied with. To the contrary, most arbitral 
awards are complied with in a large number of cases, probably due 
mostly to the fact that effective international measures are usually 
available to the winning party?3 As under the New York Convention,34 
the processes leading to enforcement of arbitral awards under the ICSID 
Convention are referred to as recognition and enforcement. 35 The ICSID 
28. See ICSID Rules 35(1) and Rules 33 - 34. 
29. Art. 42(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
30. /d. 
31. Arts. 53(1) and 54(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
32. Van den Berg, Some Recent Problems in the Practice of Enforcement Under the New York 
and ICSID Conventions, 2 ICSID REV. 439 (1987), reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. 
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 389-394 (1995). 
33. CARTER ET AL., supra note 32, at 390. 
34. NEW YORK CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
ARBITRAL AWARDS, 21 U.S.T. 215 (1970). 
35. See arts. IV of the New York Convention and 54(1) and (2) of the ICSID Convention. 
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Convention, however, goes further by making execution a distinct aspect 
of enforcement. 36 The interplay of the ICSID arbitral award enforcement 
concepts under the ICSID Convention will be analyzed below . 
. A. RECOGNITION UF ENFORCEMENT 
According to Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention: 
[E]ach contracting State shall recognize an award rendered 
pursuant to this convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary 
obligations imposed by the award within its territories as if it 
were a final judgement of a court in that state. A Contracting 
State with a federal constitution may enforce such award, as if it 
were a final judgment of a court of a constituent state. 
Article 54(2), on the other hand, prescribes the procedural paperwork 
that a party seeking recognition or enforcement must do in the territories 
of a contracting state in order to satisfy the obligations of such states 
under Article 54(1).37 
The problem with the enforcement of an ICSID award does not have to 
do with recognition of the award or with whether contracting states 
dispute its enforceability. Contracting states realize the obligations 
placed on them under Article 54 of the ICSID Convention to recognize 
and ensure the enforcement of awards. The concern is that recognizing 
an ICSID award alone does not solve the problem of outright 
enforcement. According to Delaume,38 despite the fact that the 
procedure for recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards is made as 
simple and effective as possible, a holder of a recognized ICSID award 
has only an executory title, especially if the losing party is the state party 
to the dispute. While the award may readily be enforced against an 
investor or its assets, the situation may be different if enforcement is 
sought against the state party to the dispute. 
The reason for this disparity in enforcing an ICSID arbitral award is that 
the ICSID Convention does not alter or supersede the rules of immunity 
from execution against a state which fails to comply with an ICSID 
36. Art. 54(3) of the ICSID Convention. 
37. The party seeking recognition and enforcement of an ICSID arbitral award will have to 
furnish a competent court in the territory of a contracting state designated for that purpose a copy of 
the award duly certified by the Secretary-General. 
38. George Delaume, ICSID Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 23-4 (1. LEw, ed. 1987). 
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award.39 The effectiveness of measures of execution against a state 
depends, therefore, upon the immunity rules prevailing in the country in 
which execution is sought.4o The issue of immunity in the execution of 
an ICSID award will be discussed in the following subsection. Suffice it 
to say for now that the ICSID Convention creates a loophole in the 
interest of state parties to the Convention over and above the interest of 
investors, and endorses inequality of parties in a dispute submitted to the 
ICSID. 
B. EXECUTION OF AWARDS 
As noted above, the holder of a recognized ICSID award has an 
executory title, especially if the losing party is a state party to the 
dispute, mainly because of the doctrine of immunity from execution. 
Article 54(3) of the ICSID Convention adds that "execution of the award 
shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution of judgments in 
the state in whose territories such execution is sought." This provision is 
emphasized by Article 55 to the effect that nothing in the Convention can 
be construed as departing from the law in force in any contracting state 
relating to immunity from execution of that state or of any foreign state. 
The purpose of the above provisions is that execution of an ICSID 
arbitral award is subject to the domestic law of the state where the award 
is sought to be enforced, and that no exception should be made regarding 
the domestic law by virtue of the Convention, other than as provided by 
domestic law. 
The jurisprudence ansmg from ICSID awards tends to differentiate 
between immunity from enforcement and immunity from execution. In 
Liberian Eastern Timber Co. v. Government of Liberia (Leteo v. 
Liberia),41 the United States District Courts for the Southern District of 
New York and the District of Columbia recognized for the first time an 
arbitral award rendered against Liberia by ICSID. The award in issue 
involved an attempt to recover damages for breach of a 1970 concession 
agreement with Liberia. Under the agreement, the Liberian Eastern 
Timber Corporation (LETCO) was granted a concession to harvest more 
than 40,000 acres of Liberian timber. In 1980, Liberia cut back the 
concession area by 279,000 acres, alleging contract violations by 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Liberian Eastern Timber Co. v. Government of Liberia (Letco v. Liberia), 650 F.Supp. 73 
(S.D.NY 1986), reported in 2 ICSID REV.-FJU 188 (1987). See also Anne Joyce, Arbitration: United 
States Court Recognition of ICSID Arbitral Award· Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Republic of 
Liberia, 29HARV.INT'LL.J. 135 (1988). 
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LETCO and later terminating the concession altogether. LETCO 
initiated arbi~ation proceedings under the ICSID Convention, as 
provided in the concession agreement. The arbitration panel heard the 
matter despite Liberia's refusal to participate, and ultimately awarded 
LETCO $8,739,280 plus interest. On seeking enforcement, LETCO was 
given judgement ex parte by the District Court as provided under the 
ICSID Convention, and a writ of execution issued to the United States 
Marshal for the Southern District of New York. LETCO's move to 
execute the judgement was denied on the basis of immunity from 
execution. 
The same distinction was made by the French courts in Soabi V. 
Senegat2, which involved an ICSID award in favor of Soabi company in 
a dispute arising from termination by Senegal of agreements relating to a 
project for construction of low-income housing in the capital, Dakar. 
Soabi sought recognition of the award in France. Recognition was 
granted by the President of the Tribunal de grande instance (the court of 
first instance) of Paris in an unpublished decision.43 On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal of Paris, disregarding its earlier decision in a previous 
case,44 vacated the recognition order. The Court of Appeal reasoned that 
since Soabi had not proved the commercial nature of the Senegalese 
assets that might be subject to execution following recognition, not to 
hold that recognition should be denied violated Senegal's immunity from 
execution. The Court of Cassation (Supreme Court) amended the 
erroneous decision of the Court of Appeal, holding that the decision of 
the Court of Appeal violated the provisions of the ICSID Convention. 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed as a matter of French law that "a foreign 
State which has consented to arbitration has thereby agreed that the 
award may be granted recognition, which does not constitute a measure 
of execution that might raise issues pertaining to the immunity of the 
state concerned.,,45 In other words, the Supreme Court maintained that 
42. Soabi v. Senegal, 30 ILM 1167 (1991). 
43. See Georges R. Delaurne et aI., France - Recognition of ICSID Awards - Sovereign 
Immunity: SOABI (Seutin) v. Senegal, 86 AM. 1. INT'L L. 138, 140 (1992). 
44. Benvenuti & Bonfant Co. v. Government of the People's Republic of Congo, translated in 
20 I.L.M. 877 (CA Paris 1981). Here the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the provisions of the 
ICSID Convention restrict the function of the court designated for the purposes of the Convention by 
each contracting state to ascertain the authenticity of the award certified by the Secretary-General. In 
other words, it is not the function of the court so designated to attach a different meaning to the 
recognition procedure under the Convention. 
45. See Delaurne et aI., supra note 43, at 141. 
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consent to arbitration by a state constitutes an implicit waiver of 
immunity from suit, but has no bearing on immunity from execution.46 
Having maintained that recognition of arbitral awards as an enforcement 
measure differs from execution, and is thus not subject to sovereign 
immunity, the courts went further to examine the question of immunity 
from execution. In the LETCO case,47 LETCO sought to execute its 
judgment against tonnage and registration fees collected in the United 
States from shipowners flying the Liberian flag. Liberia claimed 
immunity from execution under the principle of sovereign immunity as 
codified in the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act48 
("FSIA"), because the fees were designed to raise revenue for the 
Republic of Liberia. For LETCO, the shipowners' fees arose from 
commercial activity, and were therefore not immune from attachment or 
execution under the FSIA. Liberia, on the other hand, argued that 
because the property under consideration was Liberian tax revenue, its 
collection should be viewed as sovereign and not commercial in nature.49 
The United States District Court in New York agreed with Liberia and 
blocked execution of the shipowners' fees, relying on Article 55 of the 
ICSID Convention, which surrenders to domestic law all determinations 
of sovereign immunity with respect to execution of judgment. An 
attempt by LETCO to attach "any credits other than wages, salary, 
commissions or pensions,,50 in banks where accounts were held by the 
Liberian Embassy was quashed by the District Court for the District of 
Columbia. The court found, inter alia, that the bank accounts were 
immune from attachment under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations,51 which requires host states to accord each foreign state full 
facilities for performance of the functions of that state's mission.52 The 
court also held that the accounts were likewise immune from attachment 
46. Id. Also, the court, in LETCO agreed with LETCO that Liberia had implicitly waived its 
immunity to jurisdiction in a United States court when it signed the concession contract. The court 
cited in particular article 54 of the ICSID Convention, which requires contracting states to enforce 
ICSID awards. Liberia's accession to both the ICSID Convention and the arbitration provisions of 
the concession agreement led the court to conclude that Liberia had clearly contemplated the 
involvement of the United States courts in enforcement of the process. 
47. Letco v. Liberia, supra note 41, at 137. 
48. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2) - (4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 
1602 - 1611 (1976). 
49. See Joyce, supra note 41, at 138. 
50. Id. 
51. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961,23 U.S.T. 3227, T.IA.S. No. 
7502,500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
52. Id. art. 25. 
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under the FSIA as they did not meet the requirements of the commercial 
activity exception. 
As seen in the LETCO case, American courts tend to favor the doctrine 
of immunity and thus would not enforce a recognized ICSID award that 
does not clearly fall under the commercial activity exception of the 
FSIA. French courts, on the other hand, have limited their examination 
of the immunity doctrine to the recognition stage of awards, which they 
have exhaustively held inapplicable when a state has consented to ICSID 
arbitration by virtue of ratifying or acceding to the ICSID Convention 
and entered into an agreement providing for ICSID arbitration. Thus, the 
question of immunity from execution should not be considered until after 
an award is recognized and funds have been attached to satisfy the 
award.53 
This position of the French courts has been read by some scholars to be a 
restrictive application of the immunity doctrine that should ensure the 
smooth enforcement of future ICSID awards.54 This reasoning flows 
from decisions of French courts in other matters of a commercial 
arbitration, which, though not ICSID awards, have implied that where it 
is established that funds sought to be attached are earmarked for 
commercial purposes, the doctrine of immunity from execution may not 
apply.55 
For this author, there seems to be no difference between the French and 
American positions. If the French courts recognize a waiver of immunity 
where the activity in question is of commercial nature, that only accords 
with the exception under the American FSIA. The problem still remains 
that execution of ICSID awards is greatly hampered by domestic law 
principles of sovereign immunity. 
These cases demonstrate the distinction between immunity from 
jurisdiction and immunity from execution. Thus, enforcement of an 
award against a state falls under immunity from jurisdiction, while 
immunity from execution comes into play when actual execution 
measures are sought. 56 While it may be said that theories of restricted 
immunity and waiver of immunity are now well-accepted in many 
53. Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards under the ICSID and New York 
Conventions, 28 N.Y.V. I.INT'L L. & POL. 175, 184 (1995-96). 
54. Id. 
55. See Repuhlique Islamic d'Iran v. Societe EVRODIF, REV. ABITRAGE 204 (1982), I \0 I. 
DROIT INT'L 145 (CA Paris 1982). 
56. See Van den Berg, supra note 32, at 392. 
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countries with respect to jurisdiction, actual execution of recognized 
ICSID still suffers from application of the absolute immunity doctrine.57 
This author believes it is preposterous that a private party, after having 
put all efforts into arbitration against a state and obtaining judgment or 
leave to enforce an award, finds himself (or itself) unable to collect 
money to which that party is entitled. 58 
One will agree with the arguments of Van den Beri9 that it is illogical 
that in matters of arbitration, a waiver of immunity is accepted with 
respect to jurisdiction leading to enforcement but not with respect to 
execution. If a state agrees to arbitration, it must be deemed to have 
accepted all its consequences, including compliance with an unfavorable 
award.60 Failure to carry out the award must mean that the assets of the 
state party to the dispute, like those of a private party, are capable of 
being attached and lead to full execution of the award. It follows that if 
the defense of immunity from recognition and enforcement is not 
available to a state, that should imply a waiver of immunity from 
execution, as anything to the contrary would defeat the internationally 
acclaimed principle of law of pacta sunt servanda. 61 
There is no doubt that the reasons for the absolute immunity doctrine in 
execution of ICSID awards are both political and economic. Execution 
is commonly thought to be a severe interference with the rights of a state. 
On the other hand, a generous interpretation against immunity from 
execution could result in foreign states refraining from investing in 
countries in which their property and other assets could be subject to 
execution.62 The point, however, remains that a strict application of the 
doctrine of absolute immunity from execution leaves a sour taste in the 
mouth of justice. It means that a state may very well enter an agreement 
without intending to be bound at the outset while representing to the 
other party that it does intend to be bound. A person who benefits from a 
transaction should not be heard to say that he or she cannot be proceeded 
against to enforce the requirement of the benefit. 
It is true that Article 54(3) of the ICSID Convention contains open-ended 
language surrendering measures of execution to domestic rules of 
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approach execution of an ICSID award. It is also true that it would be 
difficult to amend the Convention to expressly waive immunity from 
execution, since the drafters were unable to agree as to the meaning and 
scope of immunity from execution, both in its domestic and international 
aspects. Nevertheless, the solution lies with domestic courts, which must 
develop doctrines of immunity that will meet the object and purpose of 
the ICSID Convention when the situation arises. A combined reading of 
Articles 54(3) and Article 55 could be interpreted to mean that 
recognition of an ICSID award gives the holder a valid title, on which 
basis measures of execution can be taken, provided, however, that where 
such measures are directed at the assets of a state; execution is possible 
under the law of the contracting state in which execution is sought.63 
This interpretation, if accepted, carries a further implication that an 
ICSID award will be subject to different interpretations in contracting 
states, as in the case of other arbitral awards.64 
The function of domestic courts in giving meaning to the ICSID 
Convention cannot be overemphasized. Domestic courts need to realize 
that international law cannot be developed in a vacuum. It takes a 
willingness on their part. One cannot help but recall the LETCO case. 
The spirit of the ICSID Convention, combined with the previous judicial 
interpretation of the FSIA, suggests that United States courts have taken 
an overly restrictive approach to the problem posed in that case.65 
Looking back to the goals that prompted the ICSID Convention, it is 
clear that the drafters of the Convention intended to create an 
international mechanism to promote the free flow of investment 
resources from one country to another. This purpose is reflected in 
several provisions of the Convention which tend to promote the 
autonomy of the arlJitration mechanism and the easy enforceability of 
ICSID awards.66 Thus, even though a narrow application of the United 
States' sovereign immunity doctrine is technically permissible under the 
ICSID Convention, it hardly seems consistent with the expansive 
language articulated in the exception provisions of the FSIA. 67 
Previous case law, particularly that construing the commercial activity 
exception of the FISA, suggests that a less conservative approach might 
well have suited the LETCO case. The District of Columbia Court cited 
63. Georges R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts,. 77 AM. J.INT'L L. 784, 800 
(1983). 
64. /d. 
65. See Joyce, supra note 41, at 140. 
66. ld. at 141. 
67. ld. 
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two decisions68 which explicitly adopt a broader view, but refused to 
distinguish them. One of them, Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of the 
United Republic of Tanzania69 had similar facts to the LETCO case. The 
dispute involved an attempt to execute an arbitral, though not an ICSID 
award, against a bank account held by the Tanzanian Embassy in 
Washington, D.C. As in LETCO, the account was used for different 
purposes, one of which was commercial. The court concluded that the 
funds could be segregated and that attachment was therefore permissible. 
The LETCO court, without explanation, declined to follow this highly 
relevant precedent, concluding that "the concept of commercial activity 
should be defined narrowly because sovereign immunity remained the 
rule rather than the exception.,,7o The LETCO decision was thus a 
missed opportunity for scholars of the ICSID mechanism that could have 
set the stage for full realization of the object and purpose of the ICSID 
Convention. The decisions of French courts are no different. 
One wonders whether the LETCO line of cases would have been decided 
the same way today considering the steps taken by the United States to 
amend the FSIA71 to enhance arbitration as a means of resolving 
international commercial disputes between private parties and 
governments and their agencies.72 Added section l605(a)(6) provides 
that a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction of U.S. courts in any 
case: 
In which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by 
the foreign State with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to 
arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise 
between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether 
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award 
made pursuant to such agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration takes 
place in the United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be 
68. Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia, 811 F.2d 1543 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Birch 
Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania, 507 F.Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1980). 
69. Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania, 507 F.Supp. 311 
(D.D.C. 1980). 
70. Letco v. Liberia, supra note 41, at 610. 
71. Section 4(b) & 4(c) of Public Law 100-669, effective November 18, 1988 amended the 
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (1976) with regard to sovereign immunities relating to 
jurisdiction and execution of arbitral awards in the United States, in particular, sections 1605(a)(6) & 
16\O(a)(6) have been added. 
72. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ARBITRATION AND THE LAw: AAA 
GENERAL COUNSEL'S ANNUAL REPORT in W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 1296 (1997). 
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governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the 
United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards, (C) the underlying claim save for the agreement to arbitrate, 
could have been brought in a United States court under section 1607, or 
(D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise applicable. 
That portion of the amendment deals only with the issue of immunity 
from jurisdiction. This article has shown that the issue of immunity from 
jurisdiction as a separate step in the immunity argument has been held 
not to avail a sovereign state party to an arbitration agreement. The 
amendment eliminates the defense usually brought by sovereign states by 
codifying the unavailability of that defense. Item B of the amendment is 
an indication that the defense of immunity from jurisdiction will not be 
available to a state that has agreed to ICSID arbitration since the ICSID 
Convention is a "treaty or other international agreement in force for the 
United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards." 
The amendment includes section 1610(a)(6), which provides a new 
exception to the immunity from execution defense of states. According 
to that paragraph, property of a foreign state used for commercial activity 
in the United States shall not be immune from execution if "the judgment 
is based on an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against a 
foreign State, provided that attachment in aid of execution, or execution 
would not be inconsistent with any provision in the arbitral agreement." 
This amendment gives a new flavor to the already existing commercial 
activity exception of the FSIA. Previously, judgment could only be 
executed against the same commercial activity on which the claim was 
based. Under the new amendment, this requirement is no longer 
applicable.73 An award creditor can attach whatever property belongs to 
the award debtor state, whether or not the property in question relates to 
the claim. 
How this amendment will play out in ICSID arbitration cases remains to 
be seen. In this author's opinion, an award creditor must still be able to 
establish an overriding commercial activity exception under the FSIA in 
order to benefit from the amendment. Thus, domestic courts must still 
interpret commercial activity, and the question of whether courts will 
interpret it to bring a given asset of the award debtor state within the 
purview of the amendment still requires an answer. It would be fortunate 
73. [d. at 1297. 
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if decisions on ICSID awards could draw from the more liberal 
interpretations of immunity from execution made in many commercial 
arbitrations to which states are parties. 
C. POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR THE IMMUNITY PROBLEM 
There remains the need to avoid the unpredictable situation of an 
investment agreement gone sour that may mature into ICSID arbitration 
and require enforcement and execution, or that may have been arbitrated, 
resulting in a recognized but unexecuted award. There appears to be no 
uniform interpretation of the sovereign immunity doctrine in the domain 
of the domestic law of member states to the ICSID Convention. There 
are two possible ways to remedy this situation. 
1. Waiver ofImmunity 
From the time of entering into an investment contract, an investor should 
properly address the possibility of waiving immunity from execution. At 
present, unfortunately, the attorney of a private investor has no choice 
but to insist on including a clause explicitly waiving immunity from 
execution in a contract with a state. Waiver of immunity is controversial, 
and thus will depend on who has greater bargaining power. Where the 
private party is in a stronger position, it is likely that the state party will 
succumb to the pressure of waiving immunity from execution. Whether 
the private party is in a stronger position depends upon the kind of 
investment contemplated.74 Experience has shown that though waivers 
of immunity in economic development agreements vary from case to 
case, waivers of immunity are commonplace in transnational loan 
agreements. Lenders almost never fail to see that borrowing states or 
other public entities waive immunities from jurisdiction and 
enforcement, whether before or after recovery of judgment. 75 It can be 
expected that as long as the relevant provision is clearly worded and does 
not lend itself to restrictive interpretation, or border on other 
considerations impacting the act of state doctrine, there is reason to have 
confidence in the merits of such waivers.76 Recognizing the 
Convention's shortcomings regarding execution of its awards, the ICSID 
recommends the following model clause for the purpose of waiving 
immunity: 
74. See Choi, supra note 53, at 214. 
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The [Name of Contracting State] hereby irrevocably waives any claim to 
immunity in regard to any proceedings to enforce any arbitral award 
rendered by a Tribunal constituted pursuant to this agreement, including 
immunity from service of process, immunity from jurisdiction of any 
court, and immunity of any of its property from execution.77 
There is no doubt that waiver of immunity will be a difficult issue in the 
negotiation of any investment agreement with state parties to the 
contract, one which most states will vehemently oppose. The real issue 
boils down to the bargaining power of the investor, which depends on the 
attendant need of the state party with regard to the investment 
contemplated. It has been suggested that waivers of immunity outside 
the financial field are relatively rare.78 While private parties engaged in 
giving loans to states may be in a better bargaining position to demand a 
waiver of immunity, other aspects of investments may require such 
waivers, especially if the parties proceed under the ICSID Convention. 
It is not uncommon to see certain economic development agreements 
contain a waiver of immunity c1ause.79 
Apart from being in a strong bargaining position, the interest of the 
investor may also influence the decision whether to negotiate for a 
waiver of immunity clause. The investor may very well take a business 
risk, hoping for the best. This kind of action will depend upon the 
existing business relationship between the investor and the state party to 
the agreement. 
2. Espousal of a Claim by the Investor's State 
The fact that state parties to the ICSID Convention do not surrender their 
right to immunity under the Convention does not absolve them from their 
treaty obligations and commitments. Thus, a plea of immunity from 
execution by a state which frustrates the enforcement of the award, as 
has been the case in the few awards rendered by the ICSID, is a violation 
of that state's obligation under the Convention to comply with the award. 
The ICSID Convention, foreseeing the likelihood of this frustration, 
provides for other steps which could be read as sanctions. Where a state 
fails to make good its obligation to comply with an ICSID award, the 
Convention restores the right of the contracting state, whose national is 
the award creditor, to give diplomatic protection to its national and bring 
77. See Van den Berg, supra note 32. at 439. 
78. Delaume. supra note 75. at 344. 
79. Id. 
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an international claim on its behalf.8o Under Article 27(1) of the ICSID 
Convention, diplomatic protection is suspended during the period 
beginning from the date of consent to ICSID arbitration and ending with 
compliance with the terms of the award, or ending prematurely with the 
dismissal of the investor's claim by the Arbitral Tribunal.81 In addition, 
since non-compliance would affect the application of the Convention, the 
contracting state whose national is involved would also have the right to 
use the remedy provided for in Article 64 of the Convention, to the effect 
that non-compliance amounts to a dispute concerning the interpretation 
of the ICSID Convention, in which case the investor's state may refer the 
dispute to the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). 
The resumption of diplomatic action due to the failure of a state to abide 
by an ICSID award, as well as referring the dispute to the IC], qualifies 
as a remedy pressed by the investor's state on its behalf. The possibility 
that such action will bring the award debtor state into international 
condemnation may influence it to comply with the award. One should, 
however, be wary of political remedies, as they have been known to be 
selectively applied.82 It should be recalled that one of the primary goals 
of the ICSID Convention is the depoliticization of the dispute settlement 
mechanism available to investors and host states. Diplomatic actions 
could have many political implications, and could drag on for a very long 
time. Espousing a national's claim and submitting a dispute to the IC] 
are supposed to be available to investors as remedies of last resort, and 
would rarely be employed by their states if the drafters of the ICSID 
Convention had been willing to adequately address the question of 
immunity from execution. 
V. THE IMPACT OF THE ANNULMENT PROVISION OF THE 
ICSID CONVENTION 
As one commentator has stated, "one of the major objectives of 
international commercial arbitration has been to keep dispute resolution 
out of the courts of one of the parties and protect litigants from the costs 
80. See Art. 27(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
8l. According to Art. 27(1) of the Convention: 
No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in respect 
of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to submit 
or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State 
shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in the dispute. 
82. Sovereign states are known to guard their relationships with other nations, and would be 
very reluctant most of the time to allow private disputes involving their nationals which do not 
squarely involve matters of security to affect such relations. 
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of plodding through the long corridors of national judicial bureaucracies, 
having to stop to rehear all, or part of the case in each successive 
cubicle."s3 This objective emphasizes the finality of arbitration 
proceedings as one of its advantages over formal judicial adjudication; 
that is, finality in the sense that an arbitration award is binding and not 
appealable. While the decisions of arbitrators may not be appealed, they 
are, however, subject to review to ensure that awards are not made in 
flagrant abuse of the law on which they are based. The New York 
Convention recognizes the need for review, on the basis of which an 
award may not be enforced.84 Review under the Convention is, however, 
vested in the domestic courts of the place where the awards are sought to 
be enforced. One would agree with Reisman85 that the optimum control 
institution for international arbitration might be self-contained at the 
international level so as to avoid national courts completely. 
Accordingly, such a control institution would perform all necessary 
control requirements. 
The ICSID mechanism is praised as a self-contained mechanism which 
prevents domestic courts from reviewing any of its decisions. The 
ICSID Convention provides for an internal control mechanism. To the 
extent that the Convention does so, it seems to be fulfilling the objective 
of international commercial arbitration mentioned earlier in this section. 
The main issue is whether the control mechanism is workable. Article 
52 of the Convention provides, inter alia, for grounds for annulling an 
ICSID award to the effect that: 
Either party may request annulment of the award by an 
application in writing addressed to the Secretary-
General on one or more of the following grounds: 
(a) the Tribunal was not properly constituted; 
(b) the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(c) there was corruption on the part of a member of 
the Tribunal; 
(d) there has been a serious departure from a 
fundamental rule of procedure; or 
83. See W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 
DUKE L.J. 739,749 (1989). 
84. Arts. 5(1 )&(2) of the New York Convention provides for grounds for the nullification or 
non-enforcement of arbitral awards subject to the Convention. 
85. Id. 
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(e) the award has failed to state the reasons on which it 
is based.86 
43 
The Article further provides that "if the award is annulled the dispute 
shall, at the request of either party, be submitted to a new Tribunal 
constituted in accordance with Section 2 of this Chapter.,,87 
The grounds for annulment under the ICSID Convention are not new to 
arbitral nullity. What is new is the control entity to which the claims for 
nullification are to be submitted, in this case, the Secretary-General and 
an ad hoc committee of three persons to hear the dispute regarding the 
annulment claim.88 According to the provisions of Article 52(6), 
annulment of an arbitral award could lead to submission of the dispute to 
a new Tribunal, presumably for a fresh hearing. 
The question that every critical observer will be tempted to ask is 
whether the procedure will ever end. The ICSID Convention does not 
specify the number of times a challenge to an award can be entertained. 
The difficulty of this situation can be gleaned from two classic 
annulment requests from previous ICSID awards: Kloeckner Industrie 
Anlagen GmbH v. United Republic of Cameroon89 and AMCO Asia 
Corp. et al. v. Indonesia.9o These cases set the stage for the use of the 
ICSID annulment process. 
The Kloeckner award involved a Jo1Ot venture agreement between a 
German multinational company, Kloeckner Group through Kloeckner 
Industrie- Anlagen GmbH, and the United Republic of Cameroon, for the 
construction and operation of a fertilizer factory in Cameroon. The 
initial contract was subsequently supplemented with three additional 
related contracts. The four agreements provided for Kloeckner to 
construct and supply the factory and to assume responsibility for its 
technical and commercial management for at least five years. Kloeckner 
was also to be a 51 % shareholder in the joint venture to be incorporated 
in Cameroon. The Government of Cameroon undertook to furnish an 
appropriate site for the factory and to guarantee payment of a loan 
86. Art. 52(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
87. Art. 52(6) of the ICSID Convention. Note further that the chapter in question is chapter IV 
dealing with Arbitration. Section 2 of the chapter deals with constitution of the Tribunal. 
88. See generally arts. 52(2)&(3) on the procedures pertaining to the annulment process. The 
Chairman of the Administrative Council is vested with the power of appointing the ad hoc 
Committee members. 
89. KIoeckner Industrie Anlagen GmbH v. United Republic of Cameroon, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/8112 (hereinafter, KIoeckner Awards). 
90. AMCO Asia Corp. et al. v. indonesia, I lNT'L ARB. REP. 649 (1986). 
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covering the cost of the factory. Three of the agreements contained 
ICSID arbitration clauses, while the agreement on the management 
contract contained an ICC91 arbitration clause. The factory was built and 
commenced operations, but became unprofitable and was closed by the 
Government in 1981. Alleging that the plant had been improperly 
designed and constructed, the Government, which had not yet fully paid 
for the factory, refused to pay the balance. 
Accordingly, in the same year, Kloeckner filed a request for ICSID 
arbitration, claiming 207 million French francs as the outstanding 
balance of the price of the factory. In a split decision, an ICSID Tribunal 
rendered an award in 1983, finding the Cameroon debt to be 
extinguished by reason of Kloeckner's failure to perform its contractual 
obligations, particularly the presumed duty of full disclosure among 
partners. In 1984, Kloeckner filed a request for annulment of the award 
in accordance with Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. On May 3 
1985, an ad hoc committee annulled the award in its entirety, citing, inter 
alia, a manifest excessive exercise of power by the Tribunal. 
The fact that the entire award was annulled by the ad hoc committee 
meant a reconsideration of the entire dispute in a second arbitration 
requested by Kloeckner. Thus, the first award did not provide res 
judicata. In the second arbitration, the Tribunal returned an award which 
favored Kloeckner, although the award gave it only a fraction of the 
amount claimed. That award was then challenged by the Government of 
Cameroon in another Article 52 procedure.92 
The annulment of the first Kloeckner award has been criticized on many 
grounds, the most important for purposes of this article being that the 
first ad hoc committee rejected the notion that its role and competence 
were limited to testing the award only in terms of the grounds listed in 
Article 52(1). In effect, the committee interpreted the Convention as 
authorizing and requiring it to examine a challenged award's compliance 
with all standards set out in the rest of the Convention, rather than 
sticking to the annulment grounds of Article 52(1).93 A strict reading 
would have limited the ambit of the control function to the enumeration 
91. International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, 
France. 
92. See Reisman, supra note 83, at 770. 
93. See W. Michael Reisman, Systems of Control in International Adjudication and 
Arbitration, in W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., iNTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 985, at 995-
996 (1997). 
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in Article 52(1).94 This reading by the committee, aside from enhancing 
its own work, expanded the future possibilities for challenging awards, 
and implicitly affected the latent compromising function of arbitration.95 
The AMCO award arose from a dispute between a United States 
company and the Government of Indonesia based on a foreign direct 
investment contract for the building and management of a hotel. The 
hotel was forcibly taken over by an Indonesian Cooperative with the help 
of the Indonesian military after cancellation of the company's investment 
license. In an ICSID arbitration, the Tribunal made a unanimous award 
in favor of the claimant AMCO, which Indonesia requested be annulled 
under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The ad hoc committee set up 
to consider the request annulled the award on grounds that the first 
Tribunal had "manifestly exceeded it powers in failing to apply the 
relevant provisions of Indonesian Law in determining the amount of 
AMCO's investment with the finding that the revocation of AMCO's 
investment license was not justified in substance," and that the Tribunal 
"failed to state sufficient reasons for its decision" in these respects.96 As 
expected, AMCO applied for a new arbitration, and the Tribunal returned 
an award on the merits in favor of AMCO on May 31, 1990. Since there 
appeared to be no limit to the use of the annulment procedure under 
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, both AMCO and Indonesia applied 
for the annulment of the second award.97 
Given the fact that the ICSID mechanism is self-controlling, the point is 
not that a party should not have the right to contest an award under the 
ICSID Convention. The point is that there is a need to prevent 
proliferation of the annulment process because of its impact on the 
resources of the parties and the finality of arbitration as an alternative 
process to adjudication in the regular courts. Additionally, knowing that 
enforcement may entail another protracted legal battle has a lasting 
impact on the enforcement of the award by the successful party. In other 
words, the unending nature of the annulment process causes potential 
parties to reconsider whether arbitral proceedings are a more expeditious 
way of resolving disputes. 98 
94. ld. at 966. 
95. /d. 
96. See Monroe Leigh, Arbitration· Annulment of Arbitral Award for Failure to Apply Law 
Applicable Under ICSID Convention and Failure to State Sufficiently Pertinent Reasons, 81 AM. J. 
lNT'L 222,225 (1987). 
97. See REISMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at \0 18. 
98. Leigh, supra note 96, at 225. 
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While the availability of procedures to review arbitral awards may 
strengthen confidence in arbitration under the auspices of the ICSID, the 
Kloeckner and AMCO annulment decisions reveal inherent flaws in the 
concepts underlying the review provisions of the ICSID Convention.99 
The fact that an ad hoc committee under the Convention can only annul 
an award, not render one on the merits, compounds the problems of the 
review process. Rather than submitting the proceedings. to a new 
tribunal, it seems desirable to permit the ad hoc committee to reconsider 
the merits of the case, taking into consideration the reasons for the 
annulment. 100 
In international commercial arbitration, as in judicial proceedings, 
control is indispensable. Yet even an institutionalized system of control, 
if wrongly designed or applied, can undermine the institution it is 
supposed to protect. 101 The losing party to a second arbitration may 
request the installation of an ad hoc committee in hopes that even a 
minor technical defect will entail nullification of the entire award and 
provide a potentially indefinite series of opportunities to win, or at least 
to stave off losing and paying. 102 This author is in agreement with the 
views of Professor Reisman that, if the trend in the Kloeckner and 
AMCO cases is allowed to continue, future losers in ICSID arbitrations 
will be hard-pressed not to exercise their option under Article 52.103 
Similarly, the availability of the annulment procedure as it has developed 
would virtually require ethical counsel to recommend its vigorous 
exploitation, leading to an uncertain future for arbitration at the World 
Bank. 104 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The ICSID Convention is no doubt an attempt to give private parties a 
place in international economic relations and access to international 
dispute resolution. This access enables private investors to feel safe in 
their dealings with host countries, in hopes that they will be able to seek 
redress on an almost equal footing with those countries in cases of 
violation of obligations assumed under the Convention. On the other 
99. [d. 
100. [d. at 225. 
101. Reisman, supra note 83, at 786. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. at 787. 
104. [d. 
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hand, host countries are assured of the absence of international politics in 
their commercial relations with private investors. 
On first reviewing the objectives of the ICSID Convention, one might 
think it a perfect mechanism for handling the inadequacies of counterpart 
international regimes or organizations dealing with international 
commercial dispute resolution. Despite its effectiveness, the ICSID 
Convention only goes halfway in realizing its objectives. The problem 
of enforcement still haunts the ICSID mechanism. Endorsement of 
sovereign immunity by the Convention amounts to giving a gift with one 
hand and taking it away with the other. Subjecting the interpretation of 
sovereign immunity, as it applies to execution to the domestic laws of 
member states to the Convention, may frustrate a private party's quest to 
execute an award. Forum shopping for execution may be the only option 
available to a private party to find a restrictive application of the 
immunity doctrine. Unfortunately, many countries still maintain the 
doctrine of absolute immunity from execution. Even in countries with 
narrow immunity doctrines, it may be difficult for private investors to 
prove that attached assets are not immune from execution. Private parties 
should not have to expend resources trying to obtain enforcement of 
ICSID awards in various countries around the world. 
Espousing a private party's claim by its state, and the possibility of the 
state seeking an interpretation of obligations arising under the ICSID 
Convention as an alternative to execution, can aid enforcement, but they 
are still political measures, which may be ineffective in a world of 
different political considerations. A private party may retain only the 
hope that international embarrassment may induce the award debtor to 
comply with the award. The annulment process affects enforcement of 
awards in terms of time and resources. It provides a never-ending cycle 
of opportunities to challenge the ICSID's arbitral awards. It is a control 
mechanism that itself lacks control. 
The ICSID mechanism could be what it aims to be. The Convention 
continues to enjoy adherence by many countries, a sign of its importance 
in international dispute resolution. The ICSID's Administrative Council, 
as a representative body of member states, should devise solutions to 
impediments which cause the mechanism to fall short of its objectives. It 
is encouraging that many ICSID cases have been settled during the 
course of arbitration or enforcement proceedings. The utility of the 
mechanism, however, should not be predicated on the unpredictable 
conduct of parties. Thus, it may be worthwhile to amend the ICSID 
Convention to eliminate the impact of sovereign immunity in the 
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execution of awards. In the same vein, there should be a limit to the 
number of times losing parties may petition for annulment of arbitration 
awards. 
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